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too simplistic and incomplete. More than a single risk
needs to be considered. These risks may stem from other
engineering or technical considerations, environmental
issues, or economic performance. In addition, when
factoring risks into decisions, the Corps recognizes that
uncertainties about the quantities in any part of an
analysis must be addressed. The reason for using risk
analysis is to make better engineering and economic
decisions. This is accomplished by increasing our
understanding of how Corps water resources investments
will perform in the future from both engineering and
economic perspectives.
This does not imply that introducing risk analysis
methods and thinking into a traditional engineering
organization has been universally embraced. To address
legitimate concerns about the necessary learning at the
technical and managerial levels, risk analysis is being
gradually applied in different civil works areas and the
process is not complete.

Introduction
Water related engineering has a long history of using risk
analysis methods. Hydrologic engineers are very much
concerned with risks in estimating the frequency of
rainfall or stream flow events. In many situations, these
engineering related risk quantities establish levels of
"risk acceptance." For instance, the Flood Insurance
Administration of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) has used the 100-year or 1 percent
exceedance flood as their "base flood." This risk standard
implies that floods that exceed this standard (lower
frequency floods) are too infrequent to worry about. In
other instances, water agencies have used even rarer
events for design purposes. The probable maximum flood
(PMF) is frequently used as the design event for
spillways. Among some hydrologic engineers, the PMF
is so rare that its probability cannot be established; it is
the last point in the tail of flood flow frequency
distribution. The purpose of the standard is to provide an
operational design criterion to meet the engineering
design goal of no failures.
In these cases, the
consequences of the event that exceeds the standard are
not explicitly considered. For the FEMA case, the
residents enjoying protection against the base flood might
consider themselves "safe." Giving a dam a PMF spillway
assures the engineer that the dam will never fail.

The following three sections describe the agency wide
usage of risk analysis by the Corps as of 1996. In the
succeeding section, special applications are described.
The paper concludes with a description of new directions
and assessment of the Corps successes in using risk
analysis.
Dam Safety

For the purposes of the following discussion, the terms,
risk and uncertainty, need to be distinguished. These
terms are frequently confused because the same
terminology is used to describe each. A common
definition of risk is the likelihood of the occurrence and
the magnitude of the consequences of an adverse event.
Uncertainty can be thought of as the indefiniteness of
some aspect of the values in the risk quantification
process. The term risk usually derives from some
initiating "hazard" event while uncertainty characterizing
the transmission of the hazard to the ultimate
consequences.

Civil engineers have a long interest in designing dams
that can withstand unusual or rare loads due to floods.
This interest in improving the reliability of engineering
structures has been generally pursued by first quantifying
the size of the rare event and then providing design
features to assure safety. The National Research Council
(NRC) report on dam safety (NRC, 1985) provides a
synopsis of the evolution of design criteria for the safety
of dams in the event of rare floods. The development of
the notion of the probable maximum flood (PMF)
represents a culmination of this evolution. This
hypothetical event is considered to have a virtually a zero
probability of occurring. The basic philosophy of this
design approach is similar to that used in regulating
human health and safety risks: establish the standard at

The Corps of Engineers and other entities engaging in
activities that manage risk have come to recognize that
this purely engineering approach to risk management is
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the dosage where there are no observed adverse effects.
With dams, however, the adverse effects are to the dam
and on humans only inferentially. Applying this
"standard" to all dams ignores differences in the effects of
dam failure at different sites.

Thus, modifications that do not reduce the hazard or
consequences of the event should not be considered
further. An alternative interpretation is that it assumes
the engineer should provide safety to the point that the
dam does not impose an added risk compared with the
natural situation. Although this approach to dam safety
does use some risk analysis concepts, it does not provide
information on the risk bearing by those downstream of
the dam. The basic philosophy is that the engineer
should not impose any added risk regardless how small.
Of course without probabilities, there is no objective
measure of the risk reduction produced by a modification
to meet the base safety standard.

Based on the NRC report, the PMF standard applied to all
dams may be excessive. The report notes that "since the
spillways of many existing dams are inadequate by PMF
standards but have survived in spite of this inadequacy, it
is legitimate to question whether this standard is higher
than may be required." Additionally, the PMF inflow
event is only one part of the chain of conditions assumed
in designing to PMF standards.
These include
"conservative" assumptions about infiltration losses due
to soil conditions, initial reservoir water levels, and
reservoir operations. This compounding of highly risk
averse assumptions may reduce the likelihood of the very
rare flood to an absurdly small probability.

Estimating the "with and without" dam failure impacts
requires quantifying the people and property at risk from
various flood events. Models routing inflow floods
through the reservoir and downstream routing of nonfailure and failure flows are used. Characteristics of these
events, especially warning time to population centers, are
important in providing realistic estimates of people at
risk. The procedures necessary to evaluate a dam safety
hazard from rare floods are codified in USACE, 1986.
These procedures describe the steps necessary to develop
the input data necessary to set the base safety standard as
shown in Figure 1.

The problem that the Corps faced was applying the PMF
standard to existing dams. Meeting the standard would
require costly modifications to spillways and
embankments. Risk analysis was considered as one
approach to choosing whether to make a safety improving
investments for any dam. One approach is to use a
comparative risk analysis (Moser and Stakhiv, 1987).
Under this method, accepted levels of risk to human
health and safety are used as the design standard. This
requires characterizing the dam safety risk by quantifying
both the likelihood and the consequence of dam failure
for the existing dam configuration and all modifications
formulated. The fatal flaw for this approach is the wide
error band for large floods calculated by extrapolating
traditional flow-frequency relationship. In addition,
getting beyond assigning a probability to the PMF proved
insurmountable.

The Corps is now starting to examine its dam safety
policy to consider all sources of dam failure risk, not just
from rare floods. If quantifying all initiating event
probabilities can be done, an overall statement of risk can
be provided and the contribution to risk reduction of each
dam modification assessed. Potentially, this might
provide the basis for establishing a risk-based dam safety

An alternative approach that was adopted used some
ideas from risk analysis but without attempting to develop
probabilities. Instead of relying on the PMF standard, the
Corps defined a "based safety standard." This design
standard is met ". . . when a dam failure related to
hydrologic capacity will result in no significant increase
in downstream hazard (loss of life and economic
damages) over the hazard which would have existed if
the dam had not failed." (USACE, 1985) Figure 1 shows
an idealized result showing the base safety standard at
less than the PMF. This policy espouses an "incremental
hazard" viewpoint. Any dam modification to pass safely
a PMF is excessive if a failure at a lesser flood has the
same consequences as those if the dam had not failed.

Figure 1: Determining the Base Safety Standard,
USACE, 1985.
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standard using a comparative risk analysis approach.

rehabilitations reduce the frequency of these breakdowns,
the cost of the breakdowns or both. Besides reducing
future project costs, major rehabilitations offer the
opportunity to restore project efficiency lost since original
construction and to increase project outputs beyond the
original design. Therefore, the economic benefit of
rehabilitation is composed of the reduced future costs and
the value of increased future project output.
Rehabilitation costs obviously contain the cost of
constructing the rehabilitation alternative chosen. Less
obvious is the cost in the form of lost project outputs
during the time that the project is closed during the
rehabilitation. This last cost is frequently overlooked but
also can be reduced by careful planning and scheduling
of the construction.

Major Rehabilitation
The Corps of Engineers is responsible for managing
hundreds of water resources investments throughout the
United States. Many of these projects have performed
successfully over many years and continue to provide
valuable services to the nation. As these projects age, the
years and wear and tear take their toll. Major
components of projects become less reliable and are
subject to both degraded service and the possibility of
failure. In addition, new technology offers the potential
opportunity to enhance the project outputs while
addressing any reliability problems. In 1991, the Corps
initiated the use of risk analysis to evaluate proposals for
any major rehabilitation of water resource investments
that it manages. Before that time, major spending for
major rehabilitation required little analysis of the
likelihood or consequences of project component or
feature failure. The Corps, with the encouragement of
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
recognized that major rehabilitation is an investment to
avoid future increased operating and emergency repair
costs and losses in project outputs due to emergency
repairs. To implement the program, the Corps developed
an economic-based decision framework that borrows
heavily from the methods of risk analysis combined with
probabilistic benefit-cost analysis (USACE, 1996).

A life-cycle approach was adopted in recognition that a
major rehabilitation makes a sure investment that must be
balanced against uncertain, future reductions in costs and
increases in output. Additionally, component reliability
may change with time and usage. The variable of interest
is the present value of rehabilitation benefits. Analytical
or simulation models must be employed to evaluate the
base condition and all rehabilitation strategies to predict
benefits. Typically, Monte Carlo simulation models have
been developed or adapted to estimate the distribution of
life-cycle benefits. Initially this involved the use of
general purpose tools such as spreadsheet macros and
spreadsheet Monte Carlo simulation add-ins such as
@RISK by Palisade and Crystal Ball by Decisioneering.
As problems become more complex, special purpose
models have been developed.1

Quantifying future project component or feature
reliability is fundamentally an engineering problem. For
investment and rehabilitation decision making, however,
the consequences of future unreliable engineering
performance must be related to economic consequences
and the economic performance of the project being
evaluated. To help identify the linkages between risk and
consequences, analysts must use standard risk analysis
tools such as event trees and fault trees. These trees are
frequently used together to expose the process of
transmitting risks to consequences and to identify
required contributions from each member of the study
team.

Quantifying the reliability of engineering features and
components has required adaptation and development of
new methods. The initial approach, at least for
structures, used a reliability method for quantifying a
reliability index of a component or feature. This method
relied on the availability of models predicting the safety
factors for features of interest. The capacity and demand
aspects of the safety factor model are based on values of
input variables such as thickness of metal and unit weight
of concrete. Any uncertainty in these input variables will
result in an uncertainty in the safety factor. This
approach only provides a snapshot of the reliability of the
feature. Because a major rehabilitation changes the
future reliabilities, a weak link in the reliability index
method is its inability to forecast future reliabilities. To

To place this into a benefit-cost framework requires the
establishment of the "with and without" project condition.
Since the project is already in operation, the "without"
project condition is "without" major rehabilitation,
defined as the base condition. Completing the analysis
requires a determination of the response to actual
breakdowns and an assessment of the economic costs
during these "unplanned" situations.
Major

1

See for example Moser, et al, 1995 and
USACE, 1994.
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develop time or usage dependent reliabilities, capacity
models containing time or usage variables are being
developed to replace the reliability index method. For
components with systematic records of failure, survivor
analysis is used to estimate a hazard function for a
component. The hazard function provides the age or
usage dependent risk quantities required for a life-cycle
analysis. This approach has been applied to hydroelectric
generating unit components.

The Corps of Engineers has used a risk analysis approach
to flood damage reduction project evaluation for decades.
A statistic, expected annual flood damage, is estimated by
computing the area under a flood damage-frequency
curve. This curve or function is derived by combining a
discharge-frequency function, with stage-discharge and
stage-damage functions shown in Figure 2. The
frequency-damage function provides a concise
representation of the risk; likelihoods are from the
discharge-frequency function and the adverse
consequences are the damages. The Corps has relied only
on the expected value statistic to represent the economic
performance of any flood damage reduction alternative.
Hydrologic and hydraulic engineers and economists have
long recognized that this computation ignores large
uncertainties in the discharge, stage, and damage. To
account for uncertainty in discharge, the Corps adopted
an "expected probability" approach following an
interagency committee recommendation.2 (IACWD,
1982) This does not quantify the uncertainty in the
discharge and carry it forward. Instead, the expected
probability adjustment increases the deterministic
discharge for rare flows attempting to account for the
sparsity of historical data. Uncertainty in the stage
calculations was recognized but not quantified.
Hydraulic engineers adopted a risk management strategy
of adding freeboard on dams and levees to be assured of
passing the uncertainty stage of the design flow.
Uncertainty in damages was ignored.

Quantifying the monetary values of operations and
maintenance cost, repair costs, project outputs, and
rehabilitation costs are straightforward. Estimating the
uncertainties in these values are currently not required.
However, in the future, these additional uncertainties may
be added to the analysis.
The current policy is to recommend the rehabilitation
strategy that has the largest positive expected net
economic benefits. Thus far, approximately 20 major
rehabilitation reports have been submitted supporting
major rehabilitation spending of about $600 million. Due
to budget limitations, not all these projects have received
funding. Reports approved so far have been primarily for
rehabilitations of hydroelectric and navigation machinery
and equipment.
One distinguishing aspect
of
rehabilitation analysis results for hydroelectric projects is
the importance of non-reliability related benefits. These
stem from the opportunity to "uprate" electric generation
capability during a major rehabilitation. The benefit from
reducing unreliability in these projects comprises only 5%
to 20% of the total, which is never sufficient to cover the
major rehabilitation cost. This compares with reliability
related benefits of nearly 100% for major rehabilitations
of other types of projects. Not all projects studied for
major rehabilitation have produced reports supporting
major rehabilitation. This implies that a "fix as fail"
strategy is the most economically efficient response to
unreliable performance.
Additionally, spending to
rehabilitate some features or components has been shown
not to meet the expected net benefits test.
The Corps major rehabilitation program has successfully
applied risk analysis principals to investment decisions
about aging hydraulic structures. Fortunately, the Corps
has not faced the difficult decisions involving human
health and safety as in dam safety. Major rehabilitation
primarily is about financial risks where the use of an
expected value decision criterion is usually appropriate.

Figure 2: Frequency-Damage Estimation

2

For a discussion and further references on the
debate about the use of expected probability see NRC,
1995.

Flood Damage Reduction
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In 1991 the Corps adopted a more thorough risk analysis
approach to the engineering and economic evaluation of
all the flood damage reduction projects it plans and
builds.3 There were several reasons for developing and
carrying out this methodology. First, often the Corps
added a "standard" freeboard to projects without trying to
quantify the error in stage. At some locations the
standard freeboard effectively provided more protection
than claimed. Second, the practice of hydraulic
engineering had not progressed with the science. The
science had become more statistically oriented and the
models for predicting stages more sophisticated than
presumed by the simplistic addition of freeboard. Third,
freeboard provided added engineering reliability and
economic benefits that were frequently not properly
accounted for in project performance evaluations. Fourth,
single indexes of engineering performance, (e.g., level of
protection), and economic performance, (e.g., benefit-cost
ratio) convey a false impression of certainty. These
single numbers masked a large amount of uncertainty
about the performance of projects.

Plan

Residual
Annual
Probability
Exceedance

W/O Project

0.250

0.0

20 foot Levee

0.020

300.0

25 foot Levee

0.010

400.0

30 foot Levee

0.001

550.0

Channel

0.025

300.0

Detention Basin

0.030

275.0

Relocation

0.100

475.0

Equivalent
Annual
Cost

Table 1: Risk-Cost Tradeoff

Current Corps policy requires the use of risk analysis
methods for all flood damage reduction projects. The
policy emphasizes concentrating on the uncertainty in
variables that are key to project recommendation. Key
variables enter the analysis by influencing uncertainty in
flood discharge, flood stages, and flood damage. By
quantifying these uncertainties, the measures of project
performance can include a complete statement of risk and
uncertainty. Specific uncertainties that must be addressed
are discharge associated with exceedance frequency for
hydrologic studies, conveyance roughness and crosssection geometry for hydraulic studies, the reliability of
existing protective structure, i.e., existing levees, and
stage-damage function for economic studies. (USACE,
1996). The basic approach advocated is to identify and
quantify the uncertainty in the variables that contribute to
prediction of discharge, stage, or economic damage.
These uncertainties are then combined using the
traditional engineering-economic model for estimating
damage-frequency as shown in Figure 2.

incorporating risk analysis into flood damage reduction
project evaluation is described in Burnham, 1996.
The Corps risk analysis approach provides a more
thorough description and can provide more
understanding about the engineering and economic
performance of any flood damage reduction alternative.
National economic development (NED) remains the
Corps decision rule for project selection. The risk
information generated can provide the basis for a
deviation from the NED plan to meet a reliability goal or
a cost constraint. For instance, Table 1 shows the riskcost tradeoffs for several flood damage reduction plans.
The NED plan might be the 20-foot levee but the local
cost sharing partners might find the residual risks
unacceptable. They may be willing to pay the additional
$100k per year to pay for the construction of the 25-foot
levee.

The Corps has developed several generations of computer
software tools to combine the uncertainties. These all
rely on Monte Carlo simulation to derive resultant
distributions of damage reduced and to describe
engineering reliability. The latest computer software

Table 1 shows only one aspect of the information
developed from a risk analysis. In fact, care must be
taken to avoid invalid comparisons since this table shows
only one tradeoff between plans. Other tradeoffs, such as
risk versus population exposed, may differ between plans.
This can occur if a plan opens land to development by
providing protection against the FEMA base flood.
Alternatively, exceedance of a plan may have small
consequences such as a channel improvement.

3

For current policy and procedures see
USACE, 1996 and USACE, 1996b.
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The Corps uses of risk analysis attempts to provide better
information to improve decisions making. As stated in
ER 1105-2-101:

Weather and human error were also considered as
contributing factors. None of the events has ever
occurred at the lock. Throughout the world, the
occurrence of any of these event is rare. A group of
vessel masters, shippers, and lock operators was used to
develop event trees mapping the process from initiating
events to the terminal event, the length of lock closure,
resulting form vessel incidents at the Poe Lock. With
these event trees, a structured subjective probability
assessment method was used to elicit probabilities of
initiating and contributing factors from this same group.
Additionally, the length of closure resulting from each
terminal event was elicited from the experts. Divergence
of options about probabilities and times of closure were
carried forward and included in the uncertainty
description of the results. Finally, the event trees and the
probabilities were used to calculate the probabilities of
different closure durations.

"All project increments comprise different risk
management alternatives represented by the
tradeoffs among engineering performance,
economic performance, and project costs. These
increments contain differences in flood damage
reduced, in residual risk, and in local and
Federal project cost. It is vital that the local
customer and local residents understand these
tradeoffs in order to fully participate in an
informed decision-making process."
Special Risk Analysis Applications
Not all uses of risk analysis by the Corps fall into the
categories where formal policy guidance exists. Risk
analysis methods have provided the only means of trying
to answer specific questions for individual projects Three
specific examples provide an indication of the scope of
Corps practice.

A third ongoing application uses risk analysis to evaluate
an existing Corps requirement to provide an emergency
closure system for hydroelectric unit intake gates that can
stop the flow of water within ten minutes of activation.
The requirement is intended to prevent extensive damage
to a generating unit and possibly the powerhouse. At
some hydropower projects in the Pacific Northwest,
emergency closure times are longer due to alterations to
improve water flow to divert juvenile fish. The study will
help decide if costly modifications to achieve the closure
time goal are worth the investment. Extensive event trees
and fault trees were developed tracing initiating events to
terminal events, possible damaging events. Probabilities
of time to closure for different damaging events have
been developed for different physical configurations of
powerplants, representative of different Corps projects.
Damages, including the cost of replacing lost power
during repairs, have been estimated for different
damaging events and times to closure. A survey of Corps
and non-Corps hydropower projects developed estimates
of historical frequencies to calculate the probabilities of
the terminal events. These were then supplemented using
subjective probability assessment by an expert panel
representing machinery manufacturers, power producers,
experts in installation and repairs, private powerhouse
insurers, powerhouse operators and powerplant designers.
A Bayesian analysis was used to combine the estimated
historical frequencies with the expert judgments.
Combining the probabilities of duration of damaging
events with damages as a function of durations, expected
annual damages were estimated for each of the
powerhouse configurations. The preliminary results
suggest that modifications in emergency gates can be cost

One application involved estimating the reduction in
vessel collision and grounding damages due to widening
of the Houston Ship Channel, (Moser, et al, 1995).
Reducing these damages is a benefit from the channel
improvement beyond the traditional shipping cost
savings. The characterization and quantification of the
likelihoods and consequences, with uncertainty involved
several steps. First, historical casualty rates for the
project site were calculated from U.S. Coast Guard
records. The year to year variability was also calculated.
Second, the distribution of casualty damages by casualty
type was estimated from the same records. These were
verified and adjusted based on interviews of affected
parties from a sample of recent casualties. To quantify
the risk reduction from channel modifications, subjective
probability assessment elicited the risk reductions from
a group of experts including the U.S. Coast Guard, the
local pilot associations, and representatives of barge
companies. Uncertainties, including uncertainties in the
risk reductions, were carried forward to derive a
distribution of casualty reduction benefits.
A second application estimated the risk of closure of the
Poe Lock, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. Of particular
interest was the likelihood of an extended lock closure
from a vessel related incident. Vessel collision, fire and
explosion, and lock gate impact, among other events were
considered in this conventional risk analysis application.
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effective for some sizes of powerhouses and some
powerhouse configurations.

in stems of means, variances, and probabilities. These
critics argue that the lay audience will not understand and
are not interested in uncertainties and risk. This is a
frequent and, partially, valid criticism of risk analysis.
Decision makers and the public need to be enlightened,
not confused. Techniques for communicating risk
information are improving and the public is becoming
more accustomed to information couched in risk terms.
There is a need to spend more effort adopting
terminology and displays of risk analysis results that
recognize the sophistication of the audience.

Expanded Use of Risk Analysis
The Corps of Engineers is pursuing expanded application
of risk analysis methods. Coastal protection projects are
similar to flood damage reduction projects in many
respects, offering a natural opportunity to apply risk
analysis. An important distinction, however, is the
cumulative impacts of storms on a coastline. To address
this issue, a life-cycle approach, using Monte Carlo
simulation to combine uncertainties is proposed. Deep
draft navigation investments display many engineering
and economic uncertainties that can influence the
identification of economically efficient investments. The
Corps is developing approaches, models, and evaluations
that account for uncertainty in forecasts of commodity
flows and vessel fleets, dredging costs, and dredged
volumes. Risk analysis applications to shallow draft
navigation investments are also under development.

Conclusion
The Corps of Engineers has used risk analysis techniques
and ideas for many years. It has only been in the last
decade, however, that risk analysis methods have been
explicitly integrated into decision making.
This
integration has provided the risk-cost and risk-net benefit
tradeoffs, and distributions of net benefits. These
provide additional information for decision making and
a better understanding of how a water resource
investment works. Given this information, better
decisions can be made. By explicitly examining risk-cost
tradeoffs, the Corps is reconsidering the value of
requiring some standard assumptions and criteria in all
instances. Allowing some flexibility can reduce project
costs will only small sacrifice in project performance.

Operating and maintaining existing projects now
accounts for over half the Corps civil works budget. To
more efficiently allocate scare resources, risk analysis
approaches are being considered to help balance project
reliability and economic value against operations and
maintenance costs.
Expanding the use of risk analysis has its critics within
the Corps. Partly this stems from the added study costs as
practitioners learn new methods and ways of thinking.
As learning grows and as new models are developed,
meeting risk analysis requirements will be less costly. By
quantifying uncertainties and explicity including them in
the evaluation, some studies may be completed without
the high cost of collecting some primary data resulting in
lower study costs. These benefits are speculative at this
time, however. Criticism on adopting risk analysis
approaches also arises from skepticism about the "value
added" of the analysis. Critics argue that if the method
does not change the answer, the Corps should not go to
the expense of conducting the analysis. Sometimes, the
answer is different, but not always in the direction of less
costly projects. Large uncertainties in flood flows can
lead to projects larger than that proposed in a
deterministic analysis. An additional value added is a
better understanding of how a project can perform. This
can be very valuable in helping cost-sharing partners and
potential beneficiaries make better decisions. A final
criticism of risk analysis is the difficultly of
communicating information about project performance

Note: All opinions expressed are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the policy of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers.
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